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Abstract. With the help of rapidly developing technology, DNA
sequencing is becoming less expensive. As a consequence, the research in
genomics has gained speed in paving the way to personalized (genomic)
medicine, and geneticists need large collections of human genomes to
further increase this speed. Furthermore, individuals are using their
genomes to learn about their (genetic) predispositions to diseases, their
ancestries, and even their (genetic) compatibilities with potential part-
ners. This trend has also caused the launch of health-related websites and
online social networks (OSNs), in which individuals share their genomic
data (e.g., OpenSNP or 23andMe). On the other hand, genomic data car-
ries much sensitive information about its owner. By analyzing the DNA
of an individual, it is now possible to learn about his disease predis-
positions (e.g., for Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s), ancestries, and physical
attributes. The threat to genomic privacy is magnified by the fact that
a person’s genome is correlated to his family members’ genomes, thus
leading to interdependent privacy risks. In this work, focusing on our
existing and ongoing work on genomic privacy, we will first highlight
one serious threat for genomic privacy. Then, we will present the high
level descriptions of our cryptographic solutions to protect the privacy
of genomic data.
1 Kin Genomic Privacy
A recent New York Times’ article [1] reports the controversy about sequencing and
publishing, without the permission of her family, the genome of Henrietta Lacks
(who died in 1951). On the one hand, the family members think that her genome is
private family information and it should not be published without the consent of
the family. On the other hand, some scientists argued that the genomes of current
family members have changed so much over time (due to gene mixing during repro-
duction), that nothing accurate could be told about the genomes of current family
members by using Henrietta Lacks’ genome. As we shown in [10] (that we briefly
describe in the latter), they are wrong. Minutes after Henrietta Lacks’ genome
was uploaded to a public website called SNPedia, researchers produced a report
full of personal information about Henrietta Lacks. Later, the genome was taken
offline, but it had already been downloaded by several people, hence both her and
(partially) the Lacks family’s genomic privacy was already lost.
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Unfortunately, the Lacks, even though possibly the most publicized family fac-
ing this problem, are not the only family facing this threat. Genomes of thousands
of individuals are available online. Once the identity of a genome donor is known,
an attacker can learn about his relatives (or his family tree) by using an auxiliary
side channel, such as an OSN, and infer significant information about the DNA
sequences of the donor’s relatives. We will show the feasibility of such an attack
and evaluate the privacy risks by using publicly available data on the Web.
Although the researchers took Henrietta Lacks’ genome offline from SNPe-
dia, other databases continue to publish portions of her genomic data. Publish-
ing only portions of a genome does not, however, completely hide the unpub-
lished portions; even if a person reveals only a part of his genome, other parts
can be inferred using the statistical relationships between the nucleotides in his
DNA. For example, James Watson, co-discoverer of DNA, made his whole DNA
sequence publicly available, with the exception of one gene known as Apolipopro-
tein E (ApoE), one of the strongest predictors for the development of Alzheimer’s
disease. However, later it was shown that the correlation (called linkage disequi-
librium by geneticists) between one or multiple polymorphisms and ApoE can
be used to predict the ApoE status [13]. Thus, an attacker can also use these sta-
tistical relationships (which are publicly available) to infer the DNA sequences
of a donor’s family members, even if the donor shares only part of his genome. It
is important to note that these privacy threats not only jeopardize kin genomic
privacy, but, if not properly addressed, these issues could also hamper genomic
research due to untimely fear of potential misuse of genomic information.
In this work, we evaluate the genomic privacy of an individual threatened
by his relatives revealing their genomes. Focusing on the most common genetic
variant in human population, single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), and con-
sidering the statistical relationships between the SNPs on the DNA sequence,
we quantify the loss in genomic privacy of individuals when one or more of their
family members’ genomes are (either partially or fully) revealed.1 To achieve this
goal, first, we design a reconstruction attack based on a well-known statistical
inference technique. The computational complexity of the traditional ways of
realizing such inference grows exponentially with the number of SNPs (which
is on the order of tens of millions) and relatives. Therefore, in order to infer
the values of the unknown SNPs in linear complexity, we represent the SNPs,
family relationships and the statistical relationships between SNPs on a fac-
tor graph and use the belief propagation algorithm [12,14] for inference. Then,
using various metrics, we quantify the genomic privacy of individuals and show
the decrease in their level of genomic privacy caused by the published genomes
of their family members. We also quantify the health privacy of the individuals
by considering their (genetic) predisposition to certain serious diseases. We eval-
uate the proposed inference attack and show its efficiency and accuracy by using
real genomic data of a pedigree. Figure 1 gives an overview of the framework.
1 SNPs carry privacy-sensitive information about individuals’ health. Recent discover-
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed framework to quantify kin genomic privacy. Each
vector Xi (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) includes the set of SNPs for an individual in the targeted
family. Furthermore, each letter pair in Xi represents a SNP xij ; and for simplicity, each
SNP xij can be represented using {BB,Bb, bb} (or {0, 1, 2}). Linkage disequilibrium
(LD) can be thought as a correlation between two variables (SNPs) and minor allele
frequency can be considered as the probability of observing a SNP in the population.
Once the health privacy is quantified, the family should ideally decide whether to
reveal less or more of their genomic information through the genomic-privacy preserving
mechanism (GPPM).
In a nutshell, the goal of the adversary is to infer the unknown (unobserved)
SNPs of a member (or multiple members) of a targeted family. For the evaluation,
we use the CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 that contains the partial DNA sequences
of 17 family members (4 grandparents, 2 parents, and 11 children) [7]. As shown
in Fig. 2 that we only use 5 (out of 11) children for our evaluation.
We consider 100 SNPs on chromosome 1. We define a target individual from
the CEPH family and sequentially reveal other family members’ SNPs (excluding
the target individual) to observe the decrease in the genomic privacy of the
target individual. We start revealing from the most distant family members
to the target individual (in terms of number of hops in Fig. 2) and we keep
revealing relatives until we reach his/her closest family members.2 We observe
that individuals sometimes reveal different parts of their genomes (e.g., different
sets of SNPs) on the Internet. Thus, we assume that for each family member
(except for the target individual), the adversary observes 50 random SNPs out of
100 only, and these sets of observed SNPs are different for each family member.
In Fig. 3, we show the evolution of genomic privacy of one target individual
(P5). We quantify the genomic privacy based on (i) attackers in correctness (red
plot), (ii) attacker’s uncertainty (green plot), and (iii) an entropy-based metrics
that quantifies the mutual dependence between the hidden genomic data that
2 The exact sequence of the family members (whose SNPs are revealed) is indicated
for each evaluation.
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Fig. 2. Family tree of CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 consisting of the 11 family members
that were considered. The symbols ♂ and ♀ represent the male and female family
members, respectively.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the genomic privacy of the parent (P5), with and without con-
sidering LD. For each family member, we reveal 50 randomly picked SNPs (out of
100 SNPs on chromosome 1), starting from the most distant family members, and the
x-axis represents the exact sequence of this disclosure. Note that x = 0 represents the
prior distribution, when no genomic data is revealed.
the adversary is trying to reconstruct (blue plot). We observe that LD decreases
genomic privacy, especially when few individuals’ genomes are revealed. As more
family member’s genomes are observed, LD has less impact on the genomic
privacy.
As we already mentioned, the Lacks family is just one (albeit famous) exam-
ple. In the future (and already today), people of the same family might have
very different opinions on whether to reveal genomic data, and this can lead
to disagreement: relatives might have divergent perceptions of possible conse-
quences. It is high time for the security research community to prepare itself for
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this formidable challenge. The genetic community is highly concerned about the
fact that the proliferation of negative stories could potentially lead to a nega-
tive perception by the population and to tighter laws, thus hampering scientific
progress in this field.
2 Solutions for Genomic Privacy
In order to prevent some of the aforementioned threats on the privacy of genomic
data, we proposed several solutions to protect the privacy of such data in various
domains. In this part, we summarize some of those efforts by focusing on privacy-
preserving use of genomic data in personalized medicine and post-quantum pri-
vacy for storage of genomic data, and protecting kin genomic privacy.
2.1 Private Use of Genomic Data in Personalized Medicine
As we have shown in [5], our goal is to protect the privacy of users’ genomic data
while enabling medical units to access the genomic data in order to conduct
medical tests or develop personalized medicine methods. In a medical test, a
medical unit checks for different health risks (e.g., disease susceptibilities) of a
user by using specific parts of his genome. Similarly, to provide personalized
medicine, a pharmaceutical company tests the compatibility of a user with a
particular medicine. It is important to note that these genetic tests are currently
done by different types of medical units, and the tools we propose in this work
aim to protect the genomic privacy of the patients in such tests. In both medical
tests and personalized medicine methods, in order to preserve his privacy, the
user does not want to reveal his complete genome to the medical unit or to the
pharmaceutical company. In addition, in some scenarios, it is the pharmaceutical
companies who do not want to reveal the genetic properties of their drugs. To
achieve these goals, we introduce the privacy-preserving disease susceptibility
test (PDS).
Most medical tests and personalized medicine methods (that use genomic
data) involve a patient and a medical unit. In general, the medical unit can be
a physician in a medical center (e.g., hospital), a pharmacist, a pharmaceutical
company, or a medical council. In this study, we consider the existence of a
malicious entity in the medical unit as the potential attacker. That is, a medical
unit might contain a disgruntled employee or it can be hacked by an intruder
that is trying to obtain private genomic information about a patient (for which
it is not authorized).
In addition, extreme precaution is needed for the storage of genomic data
due to its sensitivity. Thus, we claim that a storage and processing unit (SPU)
should be used to store the genomic data. We assume that the SPU is more
“security-aware” than a medical unit, hence it can protect the stored genomic
data against a hacker better than a medical unit (yet, attacks against the SPU
cannot be ruled out, as we discuss next). Recent medical data breaches from
various medical units also support this assumption. Furthermore, instead of every
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medical unit individually storing the genomic data of the patients (in which case
patients need to be sequenced by several medical units and their genomic data
will be stored at several locations), a medical unit can retrieve the required
genomic data belonging to a patient directly from the SPU. We note that a
private company (e.g., cloud storage service), the government, or a non-profit
organization could play the role of the SPU.
We assume that the SPU is an honest organization, but it might be curious.
In other words, the SPU honestly follows the protocols and provides correct infor-
mation to the other parties, however, a curious party at the SPU could access
or infer the stored genomic data. Further, it is possible to identify a person only
from his genomic data via phenotyping, which determines the observable phys-
ical or biochemical characteristics of an organism from its genetic makeup and
environmental influences. Therefore, genomic data should be stored at the SPU
in encrypted form. Similarly, apart from the possibility of containing a malicious
entity, the medical unit honestly follows the protocols. Thus, we assume that the
medical unit does not make malicious requests from the SPU. We consider the
following models for the attacker:
• A curious party at the SPU (or a hacker who breaks into the SPU), who
tries to infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored genomic data.
Such an attacker can infer the variants (i.e., nucleotides that vary between
individuals) of the patient from his stored data.
• A semi-honest entity in the medical unit, who can be considered either as an
attacker that hacks into the medical unit’s system or a disgruntled employee
who has access the medical unit’s database. The goal of such an attacker is
to obtain private genomic data of a patient for which it is not authorized.
The main resource of such an attacker is the results of the genetic tests the
patient undergoes.
For the simplicity of presentation, in the rest of this section, we will focus
on a particular medical test (namely, computing genetic disease susceptibility).
Similar techniques would apply for other medical tests and personalized medicine
methods. In a typical genetic disease-susceptibility test, a medical center (MC)
wants to check the susceptibility of a patient (P) for a particular disease X (i.e.,
the probability that patient P will develop disease X) by analyzing particular
SNPs of the patient.3
For each patient, we propose to store only the real SNPs (around 4 million
SNP positions on the DNA at which the patient has a mutation) at the SPU.
At this point, it can be argued that these 4 million real SNPs (nucleotides)
could be easily stored on the patient’s computer or mobile device, instead of at
the SPU. However, we assert that this should be avoided due to the following
issues. On one hand, types of variations in human population are not limited to
SNPs, and there are other types of variations such as copy-number variations
3 In this study, we only focus on the diseases which can be analyzed using the SNPs. We
admit that there are also other diseases which depend on other forms of mutations
or environmental factors.
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(CNVs), rearrangements, or translocations, consequently the required storage
per patient is likely to be considerably more than only 4 million nucleotides.
This high storage cost might still be affordable (via desktop computers or USB
drives), however, the genomic data of the patient should be available any time
(e.g., for emergencies), thus it should be stored at a reliable source such as the
SPU. On the other hand, leaving the patient’s genomic data in his own hands and
letting him store it on his computer or mobile device is risky, because his mobile
device can be stolen or his computer can be hacked. It is true that the patient’s
cryptographic keys (or his authentication material) to access his genomic data
at the SPU can also be stolen, however, in the case of a stolen cryptographic
key, his genomic data (which is stored at the SPU) will still be safe. This can be
considered like a stolen credit card issue. If the patient does not report that his
keys are compromised as soon as possible, his genomic data can be accessed by
the attacker.
It is important to note that protecting only the states (contents) of the
patient’s real SNPs is not sufficient in terms of his genomic privacy. As the
real SNPs are stored at the SPU, a curious party at the SPU can infer the
nucleotides corresponding to the real SNPs from their positions and from the
correlation between the patient’s potential SNPs and the real ones. That is, by
knowing the positions of the patient’s real SNPs, the curious party at the SPU
will at least know that the patient has one or two minor alleles at these SNP
positions (i.e., it will know that the corresponding SNP position includes either
a real homozygous or heterozygous SNP), and it can make its inference stronger
using the correlation between the SNPs. Therefore, we propose to encrypt both
the positions of the real SNPs and their states. We assume that the patient
stores his cryptographic keys (public-secret key pair for asymmetric encryption,
and symmetric keys between the patient and other parties) on his smart card
(e.g., digital ID card). Alternatively, these keys can be stored at a cloud-based
password manager and retrieved by the patient when required.
In short, the whole genome sequencing is done by a certified institution (CI)
with the consent of the patient. Moreover, the real SNPs of the patient and their
positions on the DNA sequence (or their unique IDs) are encrypted by the same
CI (using the patient’s public and symmetric key, respectively) and uploaded to
the SPU, so that the SPU cannot access the real SNPs of the patient (or their
positions). We are aware that the number of discovered SNPs increases with
time. Thus, the patient’s complete DNA sequence is also encrypted as a single
vector file (via symmetric encryption using the patient’s symmetric key) and
stored at the SPU, thus when new SNPs are discovered, these can be included
in the pool of the previously stored SNPs of the patient. We also assume the
SPU not to have access to the real identities of the patients and data to be
stored at the SPU by using pseudonyms; this way, the SPU cannot associate the
conducted genetic tests to the real identities of the patients.
Depending on the access rights of the MC, either (i) the MC computes Pr(X),
the probability that the patient will develop disease X by checking a subset of
the patient’s encrypted SNPs via homomorphic encryption techniques [6], or (ii)
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the SPU provides the relevant SNPs to the MC (e.g., for complex diseases that
cannot be interpreted using homomorphic operations). These access rights are
defined either jointly by the MC and the patient, or directly by the medical
authorities. We note that homomorphic encryption lets the MC compute Pr(X)
using encrypted SNPs of patient P. In other words, the MC does not access P’s
SNPs to compute his disease susceptibility. We use a modification of the Paillier
cryptosystem [2,6] to support the homomorphic operations at the MC. We show
our proposed protocol in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Proposed privacy-preserving disease susceptibility test (PDS).
Following the steps in the figure, initially, the patient (P) provides his sample
(e.g., his blood or saliva) to the certified institution (CI) for sequencing. After
sequencing, the CI first determines the positions of P’s real SNPs and the set
positions at which P has real SNPs. Then, CI encrypts the SNPs (with Paillier
cryptosystem using the public key of the patients) and their positions (using the
symmetric key shared between the patient and the CI). Next, the CI sends the
encrypted SNPs and positions to the SPU and the patient provides a part of his
secret key (x(1)) to the SPU. This finalizes the initialization phase of the protocol.
Then, the MC wants to conduct a susceptibility test on P for a particular disease
X, and P provides the other part of his secret key (x(2)) to the MC. The MC tells
the patient the positions of the SNPs that are required for the susceptibility test
or requested directly as the relevant SNPs (but not the individual contributions
of these SNPs to the test). The patient encrypts each requested position with
the symmetric key and sends the SPU the encrypted positions of the requested
SNPs. Next, the SPU re-encrypts the requested SNPs and sends then to the MC.
MC computes P’s total susceptibility for disease X by using the homomorphic
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properties (i.e., homomorphic addition and multiplication with a constant) of the
modified Paillier cryptosystem. The MC sends the encrypted end-result to the
SPU. The SPU partially decrypts the end-result using x(1) by following a proxy
re-encryption protocol and sends it back to the MC. Finally, the MC decrypts
the message received from the SPU by using x(2) and recovers the end-result.
Even though this proposed approach provides a secure algorithm, there is
still a privacy risk in case the MC tries to infer the patient’s SNPs from the
end-result of a test. We also show that such an attack is indeed possible and one
way to prevent such an attack is to obfuscate the end-result before providing it
to the MC. Obviously, this causes a conflict between privacy and utility and this
conflict is still a hot research topic for genomic privacy.
In a follow up work [4], we also propose a system for protecting the pri-
vacy of individuals’ sensitive genomic, clinical, and environmental information,
while enabling medical units to process it in a privacy-preserving fashion in
order to perform disease risk tests. We introduce a framework in which individ-
uals’ medical data (genomic, clinical, and environmental) is stored at a storage
and processing unit (SPU) and a medical unit conducts the disease risk test
on the encrypted medical data by using homomorphic encryption and privacy-
preserving integer comparison. The proposed system preserves the privacy of the
individuals’ genomic, clinical, and environmental data from a curious party at
the SPU and from a malicious party (e.g., a hacker) at the medical unit when
computing the disease risk. We also implement the proposed system and show
its practicality via a complexity evaluation.
The general architecture of the proposed system is illustrated in Fig. 5. In


































Fig. 5. Proposed system model for the privacy-preserving computation of the disease
risk.
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he also provides his clinical and environmental data to the SPU and the MU.4
The CI is responsible for sequencing and encryption of the patient’s genomic
data. Then, the CI sends the encrypted genomic data to the SPU. Finally, the
privacy-preserving computation of the disease risk takes place between the MU
and the SPU.
2.2 Coping with Weak Passwords for the Protection
of Genomic Data
Appropriately designed cryptographic schemes can preserve the utility of data,
but they provide security based on assumptions about the computational limi-
tations of adversaries. Hence they are vulnerable to brute-force attacks when
these assumptions are incorrect or erode over time. Given the longevity of
genomic data, serious consequences can result. Compared with other types of
data, genomic data has especially long-term sensitivity. A genome is (almost)
stable over time and thus needs protection over the lifetime of an individual and
even beyond, as genomic data is correlated between the members of a single fam-
ily. It has been shown that the genome of an individual can be probabilistically
inferred from the genomes of his family members [10].
In many situations, though, particularly those involving direct use of data
by consumers, keys are weak and vulnerable to brute-force cracking even today.
This problem arises in systems that employ password-based encryption (PBE),
a common approach to protection of user-owned data. Users’ tendency to choose
weak passwords is widespread and well documented [8].
Recently, Juels and Ristenpart introduced a new theoretical framework for
encryption called honey encryption (HE) [11]. Honey encryption has the property
that when a ciphertext is decrypted with an incorrect key (as guessed by an
adversary), the result is a plausible-looking yet incorrect plaintext. Therefore,
HE gives encrypted data an additional layer of protection by serving up fake
data in response to every incorrect guess of a cryptographic key or password.
Notably, HE provides a hedge against brute-force decryption in the long term,
giving it a special value in the genomic setting.
However, HE relies on a highly accurate distribution-transforming encoder
(DTE) over the message space. Unfortunately, this requirement jeopardizes the
practicality of HE. To use HE in any scenario, we have to understand the corre-
sponding message space quantitatively, that is, the precise probability of every
possible message. When messages are not uniformly distributed, characterizing
and quantifying the distribution is a highly non-trivial task. Building an effi-
cient and precise DTE is the main challenge when extending HE to a real use
case, and it is what we do in this work. Hopefully, the techniques proposed in
this work are not limited to genomic data; they are intended to inspire those
who want to apply HE to other scenarios, typically when the data shares similar
characteristics with genomic data.
4 Depending on the privacy-sensitivity of the clinical and environmental data, the
patient can choose which clinical and environmental attributes to reveal to the MU,
and which ones to encrypt and keep at the SPU.
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As we have shown [9], we propose to address the problem of protecting
genomic data by combining the idea of honey encryption with the special char-
acteristics of genomic data in order to develop a secure genomic data storage
(and retrieval) technique that is (i) robust against potential data breaches, (ii)
robust against a computationally unbounded adversary, and (iii) efficient.
In the original HE paper [11], Juels and Ristenpart propose specific HE con-
structions that rely on existing generation algorithms (e.g. for RSA private keys),
or operate over very simple message distributions (e.g., credit card numbers).
These constructions, however, are inapplicable to plaintexts with considerably
more complicated structure, such as genomic data. Thus substantially new tech-
niques are needed in order to apply HE to genomic data. Additional complica-
tions arise when the correlation between the genetic variants (on the genome)
and phenotypic side information are taken into account. This work is devoted
mainly to addressing these challenges.
We propose a scheme called GenoGuard. In GenoGuard, genomic data is
encoded, encrypted under a patient’s password5, and stored at a centralized
biobank. We propose a novel tree-based technique to efficiently encode (and
decode) the genomic sequence to meet the special requirements of honey encryp-
tion. Legitimate users of the system can retrieve the stored genomic data by
typing their passwords.
A computationally unbounded adversary can break into the biobank pro-
tected by GenoGuard, or remotely try to retrieve the genome of a victim. The
adversary could exhaustively try all the potential passwords in the password
space for any genome in the biobank. However, for each password he tries (thanks
to our encoding phase), the adversary will obtain a plausible-looking genome
without knowing whether it is the correct one. We also consider the case when
the adversary has side information about a victim (or victims) in terms of his
physical traits. In this case, the adversary could use genotype-phenotype asso-
ciations to determine the real genome of the victim. GenoGuard is designed to
prevent such attacks, hence it provides protections beyond the normal guarantees
of HE.
We show the main steps of the GenoGuard protocol in Fig. 6. We represent
the patient and the user as two separate entities, but they can be the same
individual, depending on the application.
GenoGuard is highly efficient and can be used by the service providers that
offer DTC services (e.g., 23andMe) to securely store the genomes of their cus-
tomers. It can also be used by medical units (e.g., hospitals) to securely store the
genomes of patients and to retrieve them later for clinical use. The general proto-
col in Fig. 6 can work in a healthcare scenario without any major changes. In this
scenario, a patient wants a medical unit (e.g., his doctor) to access his genome
and perform medical tests. The medical unit can request for the encrypted seed
on behalf of (and with consent from) the patient. Hence, there is a negotiation
phase that provides the password to the medical unit. Such a phase can be
5 A patient can choose a low-entropy password that is easier for him/her to remember,
which is a common case in the real world [8].
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Fig. 6. GenoGuard protocol. A patient provides his biological sample to the CI, and
chooses a password for honey encryption. The CI does the sequencing, encoding and
password-based encryption, and then sends the ciphertext to the biobank. During a
retrieval, a user (e.g., the patient or his doctor) requests for the ciphertext, decrypts it
and finally decodes it to get the original sequence.
completed automatically via the patient’s smart card (or smart phone), or the
patient can type his password himself. In this setup, the biobank can be a public
centralized database that is semi-trusted. Such a centralized database would be
convenient for the storage and retrieval of the genomes by several medical units.
For direct-to-customer (DTC) services, the protocol needs some adjustments.
For instance, Counsyl6 and 23andMe7 provide their customers various DTC
genetic tests. In such scenarios, the biobank is the private database of these
service providers. Thus, such service providers have the obligation to protect
customers’ genomic data in case of a data breach. In order to perform various
genetic tests, the service providers should be granted permission to decrypt the
sequences on their side, which is a reasonable relaxation of the threat model
because customers share their sequences with the service providers. Therefore,
steps 8 and 9 in Fig. 6 should be moved to the biobank. A user (customer) who
requests a genetic test result logs into the biobank system, provides the password
for password-based decryption and asks for a genetic test on his sequence. The





Advances in genomics will soon result in large numbers of individuals having
their genomes sequenced and obtaining digitized versions thereof. This poses a
wide range of technical problems, which we also explore in detail in a recent
work [3]. Mitigating privacy issues of genomic data will require long-term col-
laboration among geneticists, other healthcare providers, ethicists, lawmakers,
and computer scientists. In order to foster this collaboration, funding agencies
need to target this topic. There are numerous EU, US, and nationally funded
projects focusing on e-health, some of which address data protection. However,
the genomic privacy challenge has been overlooked, and the number of computer
scientists working on the topic is currently low. We hope that the privacy issues
highlighted here will encourage collaboration among researchers in the fields
outlined above. We believe that consideration of such privacy issues will have a
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